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Comparisons have recently been made between our present 
economic situation and the "great depression" of the early 1930s 
in order to discover parallels and to derive possible lessons.
The search for historical guidance is reflected, among others, 
in the 'rediscovery' of business cycle theory in general and of 
the "long-wave" hypothesis in particular. The long-wave hypothesis, 
formulated by the Russian economist Nikolai D. Kondratieff in the 
1920s, postulates, for the "capitalist" economies of Western Europe, 
a pattern of long-term economic development whereby long periods of 
economic upswing of approximately 25 years are followed by downswing 
phases of approximately the same duration. These wavelike economic 
fluctuations are seen as cycles with a length of roughly half a 
century. They thus exceed by far the "normal" Juglar business 
cycles and in fact incorporate these, as it were, into an evolution­
ary process.
All long-wave chronologies so far produced put the Second 
World War as the end of a third "Kondratieff". This suggests that 
the period from 1950 to roughly 1970-75 saw the upswing phase of 
a fourth long wave - the awkward conclusion being that we might 
be caught today, in 1984, in the middle of a long-term downswing 
which, although it may be interrupted by short-term recoveries 
in the course of the normal "Juglar" business cycle, will confront 
us with a basic trend of economic decline and crisis until the 
1990s. Given this long-wave pattern, the 1980s would have to be 
seen as the time of long-term downswing, followed by a phase of 
decelerating decline and recovery in the 1990s, during which the 
basis would be laid for a new long-wave upswing in the first 




























































































Such time horizons may appear fantastic, scientifically 
untenable or purely speculative. Furthermore, they do not fit in 
at all with the comparatively short periods with which economic 
policy makers normally concern themselves today - in the interest 
of re-election, for example. Nevertheless, it is a well-founded 
tradition in economics to examine all hypotheses which may offer an 
insight into burning issues of the day. The renaissance of business 
cycle theory and of Kondratieff1s long-wave hypothesis in the litera­
ture is a striking and recent example of this tradition.
To recapitulate: Academic discussion on business cycles 
reached a peak during and after the "great depression" of the 
thirties, when Spiethoff (1925), Haberler (1937), Schumpeter (1939), 
and Tinbergen (1939) published important contributions. It was at 
that time, too, that authors such as de Wolff (1924), Dupriez (1935), 
and Hansen (1932) looked closely into the long-wave hypothesis which 
Kondratieff had developed and defended during the 1920s. However, 
after the Second World War and Keynes's "General Theory", interest 
in business cycle phenomena slackened noticeably. Economists con­
centrated instead on the analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations 
using income-expenditure models or theories of growth and inflation. 
They expressed doubt as to whether the actual subject of business 
cycle theory - namely the systematic recurrence of upswing and down­
swing - existed at all. "Is the business cycle obsolete?" was the 
question asked at the end of the 1960s - for example by Bronfen-
brenner (1969). While this question, put to a symposium,' was mostly 
answered in the negative, the fact that it was posed at all reflects 
the uncertainty as to what was to be designated as "cyclical" and 
as to the part which business cycle theory should play in relation 




























































































Nowadays, aspects of business cycle theory meet with renewed 
interest in macroeconomic research. An important collection of 
writings compiled by Lucas (1981) bears, significantly, the title 
"Studies in Business Cycle Theory". In the Lucas collection, the view 
is repeatedly expressed that there are frequently long time lags 
before important real economic phenomena materialize and expectations 
are affected. One example is the "implementation lag" for research 
and development projects, investment in physical assets, the reversal 
of inflationary expectations or structural adjustments in the economy. 
There is an intuitive case for believing that economic activity is 
subject over the course of time to lengthy fluctuations: even after 
an oil shock, there is first research and development expenditure and 
only later increased investment in conserving or replacing oil - 
investment in real capital takes a long time before it actually 
affects the production process.
Hence, modern business cycle theory is, inter alia, concerned 
with consciously fitting familiar short-term macroeconomic stabili­
zation problems into a long-term cyclical context. It is in this area 
that Kondratieff's long-wave thesis has gained increasing attention. 
Major post-war writings in this field, which deal also with the 
possible existence of a fourth "Kondratieff ", did not appear, sig­
nificantly, until after the pronounced recession of 1974/75; examples 
are publications by Rostow (1975), Mensch (1975), Nullau (1976), van 
Duijn (1977), Forrester (1977), Glisman/Rodemer/Wolter (1978) and 
(1980), Schroder and Spree (1980), Petzina and v. Roon (1981),
Maddison (1982), van Ewijk (1982), and the recent American Economic 
Association Overview on "Long waves in economic activity" (Papers and 
Proceedings, May 1983). Common to all these writings is the reference 




























































































future economic activity. Only rarely, however, are conclusions drawn 
for economic policy - perhaps because these appear to be too serious.
Modern discussion on long waves has gained momentum despite 
strong criticism. The number of critical voices at least matches the 
number of those who support Kondratieff's thesis and who would like 
to use it as a serious long-term view of business cycle and growth 
policy. In the following, we are therefore moving into the shaky 
ground of a controversy which is far from being settled. This is one 
more reason to turn, as a firm first step of analysis, to Kondratieff's 
original contribution (chapter 1). Thereafter, the very existence of 
long waves will be discussed, from a present-day viewpoint, consider­
ing new empirical evidence for selected EEC countries (chapter 2). Two 
theoretical explanations of a possible long-wave phenomenon are then 
critically reviewed in chapter 3, followed by a brief, concluding 
discussion of policy implications (chapter 4).
1. KONDRATIEFF'1 S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION
1.1 Background
N.D. Kondratieff, Professor at the Academy for Agriculture 
and Institute for Economic Research in Moscow, set out his theory 
of long waves in several publications between 1922 and 1928. The 
fact that his name is linked with the phenomenon is due to Schum­
peter (1939), who wished to acknowledge Kondratieff's contribution 
by using the term "Kondratieff cycle". The long-wave movement 
was already the subject of a number of investigations before and 
at the same time as Kondratieff. As early as 1847, Hyde Clarke 



























































































cycles (later called "Juglar cycles" in honour of Juglar, a pioneer 
of business cycle theory). Jevons (1848), Parvus (1901, 1908),
Aftalion (1913), and Pareto (1916) also produced fragmentary con­
tributions before Spiethoff (1925), Sombart (1927), and the Dutchmen 
van Gelderen (1913) and de Wolff (1924) made major strides in the 
formulation and development of the long-wave hypothesis.
Kondratieff1s first published thesis on the existence of a long-wave 
pattern, which appeared in 1922, immediately encountered sharp criticism 
in his own country. In response to this, he produced further writings which 
were concerned primarily with a more precise dating and empirical description 
of long waves. Only later, when commentators became increasingly critical 
of the lack of a theoretical basis, did he provide a theoretical explanation 
for the phenomenon. In 1926, the first translation of his work appeared in 
German under the title "Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur" (Kondratieff, 
1926), which then also triggered vigorous and controversial discussion in 
Western Europe, with contributions, for example, by Woytinski (1931) and 
Dupriez (1935). Finally, Schumpeter (1939) provided a major contribution 
by incorporating the long-wave movement into a comprehensive theory of 
business cycles, including the "normal" Juglar business cycles (approxi­
mately nine years) and Kitchin's short inventory cycles (approximately 
three years).
Despite overwhelming criticism in his own country, Kondratieff stuck 
to his long-wave hypothesis for capitalist economies. This had serious 
personal consequences for him: charged with formulating bourgeois-reaction­
ary hypotheses, he was removed from all office in 1930 and banished to 
Siberia, where he died. The fact that the cyclical aspect of Kondratieff's 
thesis necessarily implied the continuous development of capitalist 




























































































policy in the Soviet Union at that time: owing to the claimed endogenous 
nature of long waves, each downswing had necessarily to be followed 
(after some 25 years) by a lower turning point and thus by a new, 
long-lasting upswing. This clearly contradicted the Marxist theory 
of mounting crises leading inevitably to the end of the capitalist 
system itself. The official Soviet-Union interpretation of the economic 
and political situation in Western Europe after the First World War was 
therefore inconsistent with the long-wave thesis: the end of the 
capitalist economic system itself, as predicted by Marx, was believed 
to be fast approaching via a chain of further revolutions and wars.
1.2 Evidence (dating and empirical characteristics)
Kondratieff had investigated time series for prices, nominal interest 
rates, bank deposits, nominal wages, foreign trade and real output of 
selected industrial products in a few Western European countries (Britain, 
France, and Germany) and in the USA, as well as the volume of world 
production of coal and iron.
Where the time series revealed a secular trend (particularly the 
physical production figures but not interest rates and prices), he elimi­
nated the trend firstly through division by the population figure (per 
capita series) and secondly by the calculation of a trend line using the 
least squares method. The deviations from the trend, smoothed by a 
nine-year moving average (in order to eliminate the Juglar cycles and 
random fluctuations or short-term "Kitchins"), produced Kondratieff's 
figures for his long waves. He found the turning points in the various 
series conspicuously concentrated on a few years, with or without trend 
adjustment. (The turning points are based on the unsmoothed deviations 




























































































that the long-wave pattern could not be a "statistical artefact". 
Furthermore, his results indicated that, despite problems of statistic­
al comparison, the long-wave pattern was roughly the same in all 
countries investigated.
On the basis of these findings, Kondratieff suggested a rough 
dating or chronology for three long waves, which is shown approximative- 
ly in Fig. 1, being continued into the present. Kondratieff did not 
regard the somewhat varying total wave length as a problem; he rightly 
pointed out that there is no strict periodicity in any social or 
economic phenomenon, even in the "regular" Juglar business cycles.
Kondratieff was well aware of the difficulties of interpreting the 
evidence collected. He therefore consulted additional descriptive and 
historical information, like Spiethoff did before him (in his analysis 
of "Wechsellagen der Konjunktur") and Schumpeter did after him (in his 
"Business Cycles" volume). Kondratieff (1926) summarized his overall 
findings in five "empirical characteristics":
(1) The long waves are part of a complex dynamic process which at 
the same time produces the medium-term (approximately nine-year) "Juglar" 
cycles (see the Schumpeter diagramme, Figure 2). But the actual course
of the "Juglar" cycle largely depends on whether the long wave is in its 
upswing or downswing phase: on the upswing of the long wave, the business 
cycles typically have only short recession phases, but marked, intensive 
upturns; on the downswing of the long wave, this situation is reversed.
(2) During the downswing phase of a long wave, agriculture experien­
ces a particularly sharp decline. Kondratieff cites as examples the period 
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(3) During the downswing phase of a long wave, there is a 
particularly high number of technical inventions; however, these are 
not widely applied until the transition to the new, long upswing.
(4) The fundamental structural changes which take place 
before the upswing of a new wave are not simply restricted to 
technological progress (as a result of previous inventions), but also 
include an increase in the amount of money circulation and an 
expansion of the world market through the emergence of new countries.
(5) The most violent wars and revolutions are concentrated in the 
upswing phase of a long wave, reflecting an increasing, explosive strain­
ing of 'economic forces' before the upper turning point.
Kondratieff stressed that these five empirical characteristics are in 
no way intended as an explanation of the phenomenon observed. He cited 
them in order to emphasize that the observed long-wave pattern is rooted 
not only in purely economic processes but also - with corresponding 
cyclical manifestations - in recurrent social, political, and technical 
phenomena. Kondratieff was firmly opposed to any attempt to interpret 
his empirical characteristics as exogenous causes of long waves; these 
long waves, he argued, are an endogenous, "integral" part of cyclical, 
dynamic manifestations in capitalist economies. In his opinion, the 
particularly marked long-wave patterns in price trends or gold production 
are not capable of providing a causal explanation any more than external 
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Kow then was the long-wave movement to be explained? Kondratieff 
postulated in essence - and in complete contrast to many claims in 
secondary literature that he had failed to come forward with any 
theoretical explanation - a theory of long reinvestment cycles.
Conceptually, Kondratieff's starting point is Marshall's 
distinction between market, short-term, and long-term equilibria. The 
long waves are seen as fluctuations around a specific long-term 
macroeconomic equilibrium (with an inherent tendency for them to converge 
toward this equilibrium). Kondratieff now adds the Marxist thesis that 
the normal (Juglar) cycles are caused by periodic reinvestment in phy­
sical capital assets with a life of about ten years. He modifies this 
thesis by postulating an appreciably longer life cycle for basic 
capital assets and thus an appreciably longer reinvestment cycle.
"Basic capital assets" include, for example, large plants, major 
traffic routes (railways, canals), large-scale agricultural projects 
(dams), and also human capital. According to Kondratieff, investments 
in such capital assets have exceptionally long life times; therefore, 
very long reinvestment cycles are generated, producing the long-wave 
phenomenon.
However, linking the life of particularly important physical 
capital assets with the phenomenon of cyclical long waves still failed 
to explain why reinvestment in basic capital assets should show such a 
discontinuous pattern. Kondratieff therefore advanced monetary arguments 
as the third and final link in his chain of reasoning, in particular 
the 'loanable funds' theory (Tugan-Baranowsky). According to this theory, 




























































































financial conditions which are necessary for substantial reinvestment 
in basic physical capital assets and hence as a basis for a (new) 
long-wave upswing (see the third empirical characteristic above).
Altogether. Kondratieff lists four (basic) financial conditions 
for a long-term economic upswing:
- a high propensity to save;
- an excess supply of bank credit at low interest rates; 
the accumulation of liquid funds in.the hands of firms or 
credit institutions, and
a low price level (to encourage savings and long-term investment).
These conditions for a fundamental self-supporting economic upswing 
sound highly topical to us today (perhaps with the exception of 'liquid 
funds'). The monetary factors mentioned were in fact largely relied upon 
by Kondratieff to explain the upper turning point of a long wave. Accord­
ing to him, the upswing of a long wave meets its limit in the increasing 
shortage and cost of finance. This shortage and cost also play an essential 
part in Kondratieff's explanation as to why investment activity gradually 
slackens during a long-term upswing: "In the course of the upward movement, 
a relative shortage of financial capital gradually develops and the effects 
of a growing cost of capital are felt; — external or internal conflicts ... 
entail... an expansion of unproductive consumption ... and accentuate the 
crisis... Finally, the steady rise in goods prices and the consequent 
fall in purchasing power ... reduce the scope for continued upswing"* 
(Kondratieff 1928, pp. 37 et seq.).




























































































Kondratieff1s attempt at a theoretical explanation was at first 
severely criticized. The assertion that reinvestment in basic physical capital 
assets was discontinuous was dismissed; it was considered impossible that 
certain inventions and techniques had to wait some 20 years before they 
took shape in new plant and machinery purely because the 'monetary capital' 
('loanable funds') was not available to finance the necessary investment.
The notion of long waves as reinvestment cycles that were determined by 
monetary factors appeared unacceptable; given the possibilities of modern 
credit facilities, it was considered unrealistic, even in the 1920s, to 
suggest that innovations had to wait until the necessary loanable funds 
were accumulated.
This indeed seems a justified objection. It was backed up by the 
argument that the anticipated rate of return of innovative capital invest­
ment was the more decisive factor - an argument which has generally 
dominated investment theory since at least the appearance of Keynes's 
"General Theory" (1936).
The empirical characteristics and Kondratieff's attempt at a 
theoretical explanation have - although he himself never explicitly 
said so - clear implications for economic policy. Essentially, they 
consist in the need to promote investment in physical capital assets, 
which has to bring about the innovative renewal of aggregate supply.
Monetary policy has to perform the difficult task of ensuring not only 
low interest rates and favourable financing conditions to promote 
innovations, but also a stable and low price level. The difficulty 
applies, however, in the "short-term" business cycle context much 




























































































2. DO LONG WAVES EXIST?
At Kondratieff's time, two arguments were put forward to challenge 
the existence of long waves.
Firstly, it was claimed that empirical proof of a long-wave 
pattern had been established only for price and nominal interest-rate 
series but not for real variables. The long-wave pattern in fact 
disappeared from Kondratieff's time series for wages and foreign trade 
as soon as they were adjusted for price changes (Garvy 1943).
Secondly, it was argued that the long waves calculated by 
Kondratieff were a statistical deception, the artificial result of 
manipulating and distorting time series on real variables.
What can be said today about these two arguments?
2.1 Long waves of aggregate production and investment activity
On the basis of the data available today, the multinational 
existence of long waves in aggregate production and investment has been 
claimed, for example, by Glisman, Rodemer, and Wolter (1978) and (1981).
For the period following the Second World War, their time series 
show falling real growth relative to the trend at least since the 
1970s in all countries under investigation, i.e. in Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and the United States. The authors 
conclude that there have in fact been long waves of economic develop­
ment even though the production series in Western industrialized 
countries have fluctuated to differing degrees. Overall, the findings 




























































































dating of the long waves. The long-wave chronology by Glisman, Rodemer, 
and Wolter (see Table 1) indeed corresponds closely to the original 
chronology presented by Kondratieff. (See Figure 1.)
TABLE 1 - Cyclical growth of aggregate production in selected 
countries (1) (average annual rate of change) (2).
- Results by Glisman, Rodemer and Wolter (1980) -
C o u n tr y
Bo 
. Kor
u r g e o i  s 
.H r a t i  p fi_______
Neo-m
Kor
e r c a n t i l e  
d r a t i e f f _______
Neo
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- c l a s s
n d r a t i ^






B e g i n n  
a ro u r d
End
a ro u n d
%
B e g in n
a ro u n d
u n t i  l %
Germany (1854) 1882 2 . 6 1882 1932 2 .0 1932 (1975) 4 . 0
F r a n c e (1905) 1938 1.1 1938 (1975) 3 .7
U .K . (1834) 1893 2. 1 1893 1933 1 .2 1933 (1975) 2 .4
Sweden (1864) 1892 2 . 6 1892 1934 2 .8 1934 (1975) 4 .0
I t a l y (1864) 1899 0 .8 1899 1934 1 .9 1934 (1975) 3 .6
U . S . A . 1893 1934 2. 7 1934 (1975) 3 .9
(1) The low points of the cycles were determined on the basis of 
aggregate production figures, using deviations of moving avera­
ges from trend. Where the beginning or end of a cycle could not 
be established, the year was placed in brackets.
(2) On the basis of nine-year moving averages of the production 
series.
One disturbing shortcoming in the data series used by Glisman 
and others is the presence of gaps for war periods (like 1913 to the 
early 1920s and 1939 to the late 1940s). This means that economic 
development during wars is simply ignored. However, economic perform­
ance in war periods is, apart from being interesting in itself, of 
considerable relevance for subsequent economic growth. Therefore, 
it appears desirable to analyze complete time series in search of long 




























































































Recently, Maddison (1982, Appendix A) has presented complete, 
and consistent, real GDP series for a number of Western industrialized 
countries. His long-term annual data begin as early as 1820 (France 
and Denmark), 1830 (United Kingdom), 1850 (Germany), 1861 (Italy), and 
1900 (Netherlands). I have used the Maddison real GDP "raw material" 
for these six EEC countries to calculate trend lines plus deviations 
from trend; the deviations from trend in log form, smoothed by a 
9-year moving average, are taken as possible long waves.
On Figures 3 to 8 the evidence is displayed graphically. Given 
the correctness of the trend lines fitted (Figs. 3a to 8a), the question 
is whether the smoothed deviations from trend (Figs. 3b to 8b) indeed 
show a second, third, and perhaps one half of a fourth "Kondratieff".
As a 'reference grid', we should refer to Kondratieff's long-wave 
chronology and/or to the Glisman evidence (see above).
Inspection of Figures 3b to 8b gives, however, some disappoint­
ment if we had hoped to detect a similar and definite pattern of long 
waves. Except for Denmark, where we could (roughly) date a "second 
Kondratieff" from 1840 to 1890 (50 years) and a "third Kondratieff" 
from 1890 to 1944 (54 years), the long-wave pattern, if any, appears 
to be quite irregular in terms of total duration as well as in dating 
across countries. For France, for example, there seems to be a "super- 
long wave" of roughly 100 years from 1824 (or before) to 1919 and a 
"half-size" long wave from 1919 to 1944 (Figure 4b). For Germany 
(Figure 5b) we might correspondingly talk of two quasi-long waves 
from (at least) the 1850s until the 1920s (70 years) and from the 
1920s to 1950 (30 years). However, a firm "believer" in the Kondra­
tieff phenomenon could advance a more favourable interpretation with 
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15 years until 1949 uncounted due to special war influences. For 
Italy, again only one long wave of roughly 52 years can be identi­
fied from 1895 to 1947 (Figure 6b), and the same holds true for the 
Netherlands (Figure 7b), with a proximate dating from the turn of the 
century until 1944, i.e. roughly 50 years. Finally, and comparable to 
the French and German case in terms of duration, there seems to be 
just one extremely long wave in the United Kingdom (Figure 8b) from 
about 1840 to 1930. But again, a more favourable interpretation is 
possible, with a 43-year long wave from 1840 to 1883 and a 47-year 
long wave from 1883 to 1930.
Overall, two conclusions are obvious:
Firstly, the detection and dating of Kondratieff-type long 
waves has a large arbitrary or judgemental component, depending on 
the researcher's a-priori beliefs and prejudices.
Secondly, due to the Second World War, there is a definite 
uniformity as to the long-term upswing in the 1950s and 1960s. All 
curves show a deceleration of economic growth (in terms of a slowdown 
or sign reversal of positive deviations from trend) with the "right" 
total duration of 20-25 years. Therefore, despite a rather mixed 
evidence for past long waves, there could indeed be one "neoclassical" 
or "Post-World-War II" Kondratieff, beginning around 1945/50 and encom­
passing the rest of the 20th century. This possibility cannot be re­
jected completely in view of the evidence.
To escape the somewhat confusing empirical results, it might 





























































































2.2 Are the long waves a statistical deception?
As early as the period between the wars, doubts were expressed 
concerning Kondratieff's statistical method (involving calculation and 
smoothing of deviations from trend) and the claimed long-wave movement 
was criticized as a "statistical artefact". The arguments were as 
follows:
(a) It is always possible, with a suitable polynomial, to fit a trend 
line to existing growth cycles such that the deviations from trend 
yield long waves or any other cycles - depending on the method of 
calculating the trend.
(b) The breakdown of time series into cyclical and trend components 
is asserted to be inadmissible, as trend and deviations from trend
are an expression of the same economic growth process; their statistic­
al breakdown is therefore said to be unjustified (see Garvy, 1943).
These objections, which were raised decades ago, can still be 
heard today as time-series analysis has made considerable progress. In 
a critical analysis of the recent papers by Glisman et al. on the 
long-wave phenomenon, Kleinknecht (1979) argues, for example, that the 
statistical method of revealing the long-wave phenomenon (adjustment 
and smoothing) produces just this pattern. However, additional spectral 
and correlation analyses seem to confirm (in the case of the German data 
at least) that there is no statistical artefact (Glisman et al., 1980, 
pp. 10/11). It is, however, possible in principle that the smoothing of 
trend deviations may artificially produce cyclical Juglar fluctuations 
which are not present in the original series ("Slutsky effect"). On the 
other hand, long waves have long ago been identified, without trend 




























































































for example, by Woytinski (see Figure 9).
In summary, the charge of "statistical artefact" remains a 
controversial and unresolved issue.
3. THEORIES OF A LONG-WAVE CYCLE
Given that the existence of long waves cannot be ruled out com­
pletely, the question as to the cyclical quality of long waves is 
important: it leads directly to the rather fateful inquiry of whether 
we are presently in the downswing phase of a fourth "neo-classical" 
Kondratieff: Is there more crisis or depression ahead in the 1980s?
For some observers, this question has to be answered with a flat 
YES: "At present, we are in the grip of the 'second lag' of the fourth 
Kondratieff cycle ..." (Kaldor, 1982, p. 18). In order to substantiate 
such an assertion, however, a theory must first be found which satis­
factorily explains the recurrent and endogenous, and hence cyclical, 
nature of the long waves. Secondly, it has to be established whether 
- against the background of such a theory - there is empirical evidence 
of a cyclical long-wave pattern.
Before looking into these rather complex matters, the early 
criticism levelled against the long-wave hypothesis should be 
recalled. Kondratieff was criticized on the score that long waves, 
even when regarded as empirically existing, cannot be interpreted as 
a cyclical phenomenon. Contemporary critics in Soviet Russia in 
particular viewed the differences in length and between countries of 
the three long waves simply as qualitative proof of historically 





























































































Movement in wholesale prices in Britain, 1850 - 1910, and their trend.
wholesale index numbers.
Third-degree trend in wholesale index numbers. 
Sixth-degree trend in wholesale index numbers.
S o u r c e :  W. W o y t i n s k i :  
55. Jahrgang,
Das Ratsel der langen Mellen, 
II. Halbband, 1931, p. 601.




























































































Trotzky (1923), for example, while accepting the existence of 
long waves, did not regard them as a regularly recurring - and thus 
cyclical - phenomenon stemming from the "internal dynamics of the 
capitalist economic system". He rather believed they were non-recurring 
historical developments each of which was caused by unique and quite 
specific political and economic circumstances. Other critics (Oparim, 
Gerstein) saw Kondratieff's long waves as individual historical trend 
periods of economic growth which had no significant connection with 
Kondratieff's claimed "clustering" of innovations at the beginning 
of a new long-wave upswing. A cyclical long-wave pattern was not 
apparent to them.
In response to Kondratieff's attempted explanation and sub­
sequent theoretical discussions (e.g. by Spiethoff, 1925, Kuznets,
1930, and Schumpeter, 1939), two competing hypotheses of a cyclical 
long-wave phenomenon have developed: the innovation hypothesis and 
the distribution hypothesis.
3.1 The modern innovation hypothesis
The modern innovation hypothesis combines the original innovation 
thesis of Schumpeter (1939) with the over-investment theory of Spiethoff 
(1925) and Forrester (1976) and the theory of industrial cycles by Kuznets 
(1929) and Vernon (1966). More recently, it has been analyzed by van Duijn 
(1977) and Kleinknecht (1980).
The starting point is Schumpeter's thesis that cycles result from 
the differing pace at which innovations are implemented. Cyclical long 
waves stem from the simultaneous emergence of pioneering firms which, con­
centrated at the lower turning point of a long wave, introduce basic 
innovations, rake in pioneering profits from the "new combinations" and then 




























































































This starting point is of course - it must be said straight 
away - open to attack on a number of points: why do the pioneering 
firms emerge in such a concentrated (unevenly distributed) fashion?
Here it can be argued, broadly in line with Kondratieff, that difficult 
conditions in times of depression may hinder the practical application 
of "new combinations" for some time. Why, however, should basic inno­
vations, assuming for the moment that they are endogenous in character, 
produce fifty-year cycles? The modern innovation hypothesis adduces 
here (again inspired by Kondratieff) an "echo effect" whereby the con­
centrated production of capital goods also gives rise to clustered 
reinvestment. The basic innovations of Schumpeter's pioneering firms 
induce a series of industrial cycles which lead to a surge in demand 
for capital goods. These industrial cycles, which are cycles specific 
to individual branches, stem from the lifespan of basic innovations 
(e.g. television) and improvement innovations (e.g. colour television); 
inherent in them is a matching reinvestment pattern.
The scenario is that the surge in demand for capital goods leads 
to the growth of new industries. This in turn causes, in the capital 
goods sector, a backlog of orders and production bottlenecks. Production 
capacity is expanded. However, lengthening order books prompt manu­
facturers of capital goods to form exaggerated sales expectations and 
this generates all the excesses of a boom. They do not recognize in 
time that a saturation point will progressively be reached.
These arguments repeat basically Spiethoff's ideas of "over­
production" of physical capital assets: Because the rise in effective 
aggregate demand is overstimated, there is increased stockbuilding, a 
reduction in the order backlog in the capital-goods sector and, finally, 
under-utilization of capacity. Firms now go to the other extreme: with 




























































































pessimistically, investment is shunned and there is a sharp fall in 
the investment ratio.
In the ensuing downward phase of the long wave, investment in 
conventional technology becomes less and less profitable, the longer 
and the sharper the downswing is. National economies are increasingly 
incapable of overcoming the economic slump by themselves. Only when a 
new generation of courageous pioneering firms comes forward with a 
new generation of basic innovations can the next long-wave upswing 
begin.
In essence, the innovation hypothesis is characterized by regularly 
recurring misguided reactions of economic decision makers (i.e. false 
expectations of manufacturers of capital goods). This point is open to 
criticism: Should we not expect "rationally" acting economic agents to form 
rational expectations? The innovation hypothesis at any rate implies an 
unchanged incapacity from one generation of entrepreneurs to another to 
learn from the mistakes of the past. Kaldor may have had this in mind 
when he commented: "Indeed the most plausible explanation seems to be that 
these cycles are fundamentally a reflection of cycles in human thought 
and preferences, and their length is best explained by the fact that 25 
years is normally taken as the best estimate of the length of a human 
generation (Kaldor, 1982, pp. 18/19). This statement shows Kaldor as a 
supporter of the German business-cycle analyst Wagemann who, as early as 
1928, linked the change of generations with the long-wave phenomenon (see 
also the discussion in Weinstock, 1964, pp. 66-68).
All in all, there are two weak points in the modern innovation 
thesis: Firstly, a downswing does not necessarily entail an automatic 
bunching of basic innovations; all it does is to create favourable 




























































































tifying such innovations into even sharper focus. Moreover, attempts 
to prove the existence of such clustering by means of modern statistical 
methods have so far been unsuccessful (van Duijn, 1977, p. 570; Glisman 
et al., 1980, p. 4).
Secondly, no explanation is offered of why firms continually react 
to market signals only after a considerable time lag and therefore keep 
over-reacting without learning their lesson. Here, recent analyses by 
Lucas (1981) could be incorporated into the hypothesis: it could, for 
example, be postulated that large firms must nowadays be seen as 
institutions or even as bureaucracies which - unlike individuals - 
learn only slowly and react ponderously (see also Glisman et al., 1980, 
p. 6). This would imply, however, that, with increasing bureaucratization, 
the "wrong" reactions increase in duration and intensity - an impli­
cation for which there is even some supporting evidence (see below).
3.2 The distribution theorem
The distribution theorem was recently expounded by Glisman, Rodemer, 
and Wolter (1978 and 1980) and it is based, amongst other things, on the 
German Council of Economic Advisers' concept of wages which do not 
push up cost levels (wage 'neutrality'). The distribution theory, too, 
is based on concentrated changes in investment activity as the factor 
triggering long -wave fluctuations in national product. However, invest­
ment fluctuations are caused by price distortions on the factor and 
product markets, which in turn directly affect firms' profit expectations. 
The chain of causality is therefore profit expectations investment ->
national product.




























































































Through a wage policy that is not neutral in its effect on costs, 
functional income distribution may be so altered that real wages rise 
relative to business profits (this happened in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the 1970s). If wages rise faster than can be absorbed without 
effect on costs, firms increasingly substitute capital for labour. Capital 
productivity is reduced and profit expectations and investment activity 
decline.
- Firms' profit expectations are also squeezed, according to the theory, 
by the spread of bureaucratic obstacles that are associated with the 
expansion of the public sector consumption ratio and lead to an increasing 
bureaucratic paralysis of entrepreneurial activities.
These postulated inter-relationships are added together to give 
the following sequence of events (see also Glisman et al., 1980, pp. 7-12).
- At the outset, growth equilibrium is disrupted by organized group inter­
ests - e.g. by trade unions exploiting their power position and generating 
cost pressures on factor markets.
- Because of the persistent pressure of costs, investment activity slackens 
and production declines (in relative terms). The longer the contraction 
phase lasts, however, the more the interest groups which caused the dis­
ruption lose power. This may be due to the fact that, with decline continu­
ing, their financial base is eroded and their members increasingly lose 
confidence in their organizations and desert them; the self-interest of 
organizations may therefore prompt them to absorb the lessons of the 
downswing, moderating the struggle over distributive shares. Changes in 
social attitudes ("Zeitgeist") work in the same direction. The reduction





























































































As cost pressures slacken, profit expectations again improve and a 
new upswing begins. As the upswing increases in duration, more and more 
shortages develop on goods and factor markets which encourage new 
monopolization tendencies. The same institutional and societal inertia 
which was operative during the downswing prevents the interest groups 
from reacting in time to their changing power; their 'approach', 
marked by the last crisis, is not altered rapidly enough.
In my view, the most important objection to the distribution hypo­
thesis is that it fails to substantiate the argument that the postulated 
course of events causes a long-wave pattern - and not a normal 
business cycle. This is the disadvantage of dropping the idea of the 
systematic clustering of basic innovations.
As in the case of the innovation hypothesis, misguided reactions 
on the part of economic decision makers are postulated. However, they 
do not relate to mistaken (and regularly recurring) expectations of 
investors, but to the struggle between interest groups over distributive 
shares. These groups engage in the struggle for the sake of short-term 
benefits, but overlook the fact that in the long term they bring dis­
advantages for all concerned. The failure to see the long-term disad­
vantages can be traced to the same factors as the overreaction of 
investors (e.g. unwieldiness of institutions and bureaucratic 
structures).
3.3 Cyclical qualities of both hypotheses
Conclusions regarding the cyclical explanatory value of both 
hypotheses for a possible long-wave phenomenon can be kept brief. 




























































































the economy-wide organized representation of group interests did not 
occur until the end of the 19th century; the first two Kondratieff waves 
(1790-1847; 1847-1893) cannot therefore be explained applying this 
hypothesis. Supporters of the distribution hypothesis actually concede 
that their investigations do not show a general "law" of cyclical develop­
ment, and their studies avoid to interpret long-term fluctuation in economic 
development as cyclical phenomena (see, for example, Glisman et al., 1978 
and 1980, p. 12).
The modern innovation hypothesis, on the other hand, can be applied 
to all observed long waves as a possible explanation. With its thesis of 
the concentrated emergence of new products and technologies ("basic inno­
vations") before the beginning of a long-wave upswing, it focuses attention 
on a clearly endogenous imbalance mechanism in the market system. This 
mechanism works through the relationship between profit trends and expecta­
tions, investment and growth (to this extent, there is no essential 
difference between the modern innovation and distribution theories).
Owing to its larger empirical content, the innovation hypothesis should 
be our first choice as a testable hypothesis of a cyclical long-wave 
phenomenon.
It should be added that the theoretical and empirical study of 
long waves must not be restricted to one cause only. Clearly, distribu­
tion aspects have also played a part, particularly in the last two decades. 
Nor should we neglect the fact that some Western economies underwent a 
reconstruction phase following the Second World War. We therefore again 
find ourselves on shaky ground as far as theoretical arguments are con­
cerned; there is no satisfactory and complete theoretical model of a 
long-wave cycle. The usual, but methodologically questionable rection 




























































































as will be shown subsequently, there is presently no systematic and/or 
convincing evidence at hand for a firm "Yes" or "No" to any tested 
long-wave hypothesis.
3.4 Testing the hypotheses partially
Preliminary comments on the data problem and earlier test results
Even if we have a reasonably satisfactory thesis, the enormous time 
horizon of long waves would appear to condemn strict statistical tests to 
failure from the outset. A rigorous, comprehensive statistical test cannot 
in fact be applied to the long-wave thesis if only because of the for- 
titious influences and external shocks that might occur during the course 
of half a century.
Fierce critics such as Kuznets have used this circumstance to 
flatly reject the phenomenon of long waves (Kuznets, 1953; Rostow, 1975; 
in the case of Kuznets, there may also have been personal reasons). Further­
more, with a maximum of three and a half 1Kondratieffs1 so far observable, 
the data basis (frequency) necessary for confirming the claimed empirical 
characteristics of long waves looks far too narrow. Van Duijn speaks of
"at least a further one hundred years" before a final judgement can be 
formed about the existence of a self-repeating long wave (van Duijn, 1977,
p. 566). Yet more modest, partial hypothesis tests can in fact advance our
knowledge to some degree.
An examination has been made, for example, of Kondratieffs first 
empirical characteristic, namely that the upswing phase of a regular (Juglar) 
business cycle during an upturn in the long wave is longer than during 
a downswing. The 'reference cycle' investigation by Burns and Mitchell 




























































































France, and the United Kingdom confirmed Kondratieff's observation; 
there were no significant deviations in the cycle lengths across the 
countries mentioned.
More important, however, are tests which directly examine the centre­
piece of the innovation theory - the assertion that basic innovations 
are concentrated before the upswing phase of a long wave. Test results 
for a possible "fourth Kondratieff" are summarized below. It should be 
noted, however, that no attempt was made to examine whether each of the 
long waves is in fact the result of the same endogenous forces. This also 
leaves doubts about whether the fourth long wave can justifiably be extra­
polated into a "depression phase". Perhaps we should simply accept that 
sceptical questions about the existence of long waves cannot be answered 
until a comprehensive study has been made of the mechanism of the normal 
(Juglar) cycles. After all, the cyclical forces which produce the long 
waves cannot work independently of those which generate the short cycles 
(see Haberler, 1975).
Some partial findings of recent innovation research
Kondratieff's "empirical characteristic" according to which a 
clustering of basic innovations can be observed toward the end of a 
long-wave downswing receives some backing from recent investigations 
(see for example Mensch, 1975); the claim that product/process inno­
vations are concentrated around 1830/1840, 1885, and 1935 has been 
shown to be correct. If we assume that the modern innovation hypothesis 
is valid, it should be possible to demonstrate, firstly, that during the 
upswing phase of a long wave the emerging growth industries are those 
which implemented basic innovations during the preceding downswing phase 
and, secondly, that these "innovation industries" stagnate in their 




























































































An empirical examination of this kind was recently carried out for 
the German economy from 1950 to 1977 (Kleinknecht, 1980). This established 
that the growth industries of the 1950s and 1960s (plastics processing, 
mineral-oil processing, chemicals, electrical engineering, road vehicle 
and aircraft manufacture) were the very industries which experienced a 
considerable surge in basic innovations during the 1930s and 1940s. It was 
also observed that the present weak growth conditions have coincided with 
the relative stagnation of most of the original growth industries. An indi­
cator for industrial business profits suggests that this development in the 
production structure has been accompanied by a parallel movement in profits.
Further evidence of a "fourth Kondratieff"
More recent tests based on the distribution theory also show, for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, that the slower growth in the 1970s can 
be interpreted as the onset of the downward phase of a fourth long wave 
(see Glisman et al., 1978). The diagnosed trend in national product was 
traced back, amongst other things, to fluctuations in the functional 
distribution of income ("wages explosion" in the early 1970s) and to the 
expansion of the public sector (public sector comsumption ratio). This is 
therefore another test result which indicates that, applying the distribu­
tion theory, we are in the downward phase of a long wave.
Finally, international "empirical characteristics" of the past 
three decades have been cited which, in the manner of a shock, have 
contributed to the upper turning point of a long wave in the 1970s. 
Reference is frequently made in this connection to the first oil shock 
at the end of 1973, the related emergence of an international oil cartel, 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system at the beginning of 1973, the 




























































































all factors which have increasingly affected national economies owing 
to the sharp growth in international interdependence. It must be stressed 
here, however, that such exogenous events, quite in line with Kondra- 
tieff's theory, are not to be used as a causal explanation of long 
waves. It is also debatable how far the hypotheses mentioned, which 
were tested for Germany, can be applied to other countries. This also 
raises the question of the mechanism by which fluctuations in economic 
growth are transmitted between countries. It is indeed tempting to 
speculate (as Kaldor has suggested) that parallel fluctuations in economic 
activity in the Western industrialized countries are the result of 
"Zeitgeist" value patterns changing from generation to generation and 
transcending frontiers.
4. ECONOMIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
We cannot fully reject the possible existence of a "long wave" 
beginning after World War II. Therefore, we cannot fully dismiss the 
possibility that we are presently in the downward phase of a fourth 
long wave; further economic crisis and depression in the 1980s is a real 
danger, even if there should be a brief recovery over the next few years. 
If there is such a thing as long waves, it is in principle of major 
importance to find out if it is a cyclical phenomenon. However, we are 
presently not in a position to give a firm answer. On the one hand, the 
1980s may well see a sustained economic recovery, demonstrating that there 
is no (fourth) long wave at all. After all, the partial research findings 
mentioned above concern a theory which has not yet been coherently 
formulated and fully tested.
On the other hand, the available research results do not exclude 




























































































a long wave. Nor have the shorter-term "alternatives" of a modern 
supply-side policy or of conventional Keynesian demand management 
been cleared of all theoretical and empirical doubts. Consequently, 
the study of long waves yields more than just the usual conclusion 
that further research is necessary. It also highlights the need for 
economic policy thinking to be fitted into time perspectives which 
are much longer than the conventional one-to-four-years horizon.
The fundamental question for economic policy makers is thus whether 
and how gloomy prospects for the 1980s and 1990s can be counteracted.
Can conventional business cycle policy have an impact at all? In the 
long term, it may be unable to influence developments decisively, 
particularly if the long-wave phenomenon were cyclical and endogenous 
in character. This is, admittedly, a very resigned observation. But it 
•may be more helpful than the usual purposive optimism, displayed year 
in and year out, that the next upswing is "just around the corner".
In practical policy terms, the potential existence of a present 
"neoclassical" or "Post-World-War-II" Kondratieff could mean the 
following:
(1) Medium-term forecasts which predict a sustained upswing in the 
second half of the 1980s (or tax revenue projections based on them) should 
be treated with even more caution than usual.
(2) A stabilization programme that is geared to the short or medium 
term need not at the same time be the most effective programme for 
shortening a long-wave downswing. If, for example, a certain depression 
phase would in fact need to be reached before there could be an endo­
genous surge in investment activities, it might be appropriate to pursue 




























































































(3) Apart from these points a quite pragmatic call must be made 
for greater emphasis on (at least) two particular long-term aspects 
of economic policy making:
- in the monetary policy field, consideration should be given to 
setting a monetary target for a number of years in advance and to 
deliberately aiming for an optimum long-term combination of low price 
inflation, low nominal interest rates, and exchange-rate levels con­
sistent with these;
- in the incomes policy field it should be brought home to interest 
group struggles over distributive shares that short-term advantages
may carry the price of long-term disadvantages for all if, for example, 
subsidies and redistributions delay or prevent the structural change 
necessary for a surge in investment and economic activity.
(4) An effective stabilization programme should be based on a 
careful forecast of current cyclical movements, not only in order to be 
able to influence the present phase of the "normal" business cycle but 
also to consider possible policy action against a long-wave downswing.
In the final analysis, doubts about the existence of long waves probably 
cannot be settled until we have a reasonably full insight into the 
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